Two Way Street

← Air Defence

The whole story of Air Defence, from the beginning

4 chapters  ·  drawn from 45 entries, first April 2026

Chapter 1

Ukraine's air defence is losing ground on two counts at once

Ukraine's air defence is losing ground on two counts at once. Against ballistic missiles it depends on the American Patriot, the only interceptor proven against Russia's Iskander-M, and by October 2026 it was reported to have none left. Against Russia's one-way attack drones it had built a cheap, home-grown defence that worked, until Russia put jet engines on them. Both gaps trace back to the same arithmetic: Russia is firing more, and faster, than Ukraine can find things to shoot at it.

Chapter 2

The drone half of the story is a contest of adaptation

The drone half of the story is a contest of adaptation. Through 2025 Ukraine beat the propeller-driven Shahed with interceptor drones and mobile gun crews; one air-defence commander put the share stopped at 80 to 93 per cent. Those rates made slow drones too costly to spend on deep targets, and by September Russia had pulled them back to strike within 200 kilometres of the front line. Its answer for deep strike was the jet engine. Jet Shaheds were 15 to 20 per cent of Russia's drones in July and about half of its strike packages by early September; the Air Force counted 350 launched in June and 3,500 a month by September. The newest, the Geran-5, flies far faster than the interceptors built for its predecessors and too high for the gun crews defending Kyiv. Ukraine has fielded new layers in turn: a truck-mounted Hellfire system, faster interceptor drones, and in August its first jet-powered interceptor, the Alexa Spatium. More than sixty companies are working on the problem, and in September Zelenskyy ordered mass production of high-speed interceptors. The first jet Shahed kill by an interceptor was filmed on September 19, and two named prototypes are reported to have downed a few Geran-5s. But on Zelenskyy's own figure only 57 per cent of jet drones were being stopped at the end of September, and fighter jets remain the main answer. Even those are short of missiles: Ukraine's F-16 pilots have been rationing air-to-air rounds and sometimes flying with only the gun.

Chapter 3

The missile half is a story of supply

The missile half is a story of supply. Ukraine intercepted 29 of the 195 ballistic missiles Russia fired at it in July, and Ukraine's drone commander says Russia is working to raise a single salvo from 77 missiles to about 200. Western deliveries of interceptors fell in 2026 to about a third of their 2025 level, Ukraine says, as demand for Patriots rose in the Middle East and the US drew down its own stocks. The Pentagon's denial of that depletion was contradicted by its own conduct and by outside estimates. About 95 per cent of the Patriots that do arrive come through PURL, the NATO scheme in which allies buy American weapons for Ukraine. Zelenskyy asked Trump for 300 interceptors as an emergency winter package in July; the Financial Times reported he was refused. Kyiv has since sent its ambassadors to find missiles in other countries' warehouses. South Korea said no, and allies have released a handful at a time. Ukraine says it is contracting about 1,000 Patriots, but most will ship only in the coming years. A $2.68 billion American air-defence sale approved in September contained no Patriots at all. In October a source told CNN the interceptors were gone, and on October 13–14 four of 39 ballistic missiles were stopped. A NATO official says deliveries continue.

Chapter 4

Building Patriots in Ukraine would not fix this winter

Building Patriots in Ukraine would not fix this winter. Trump promised a production licence at the Ankara summit on July 8 and withdrew it on July 31, saying "We have not agreed to that." Zelenskyy has twice said since that the decision was made, but the White House said nothing was decided, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon slowed the arrangement, and by October no licence had been issued. Every estimate of the timetable has grown longer, now from 12 months to five years. Lockheed's $58.6 billion contract aims to triple PAC-3 MSE capacity only by the end of 2030. A cheaper European-backed interceptor, Fire Point's FP-7, aims for a prototype in the first half of 2027 and has yet to intercept anything. The open questions are whether the reported Patriot exhaustion is confirmed or relieved, whether a jet interceptor reaches mass production before winter, and whether an interceptor maker's hope, voiced on October 1, of "more controlling the air again" within four to eight weeks is borne out.

And now

Ukraine has too few of the missiles that stop ballistic attack, and the drones built to stop jet Shaheds have been grounded by a satellite limit.

A source told CNN on October 15 that Ukraine had run out of Patriot interceptors; the Air Force stopped four of 39 ballistic missiles on October 13–14. Zelenskyy does not confirm the stock is gone, but on October 16 in Brussels he acknowledged “a major shortage”: most PAC-2 and PAC-3 rounds go to the Middle East, and Ukraine is “not the No. 1 priority”. He renewed his request for a 300-interceptor winter package, said Europe has enough to cover it, and said he does not yet know how many Europeans will give. Allies have so far named five missiles from Spain and a classified Polish number. A licence to build Patriots is still unissued.

Jet-powered Gerans are the other gap. In September the Air Force shot down 54 percent of 3,520, against about 90 percent of propeller drones. Interceptor drones that chase them steer over Starshield, which since October 14 cuts out above about 160 km/h; Zelenskyy said on October 17 the limit still stops them, and Kyiv is negotiating with Washington and SpaceX.

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Covered since Apr 2026